Consensus forecasts are ine¢ cient. The weight placed on new information re ‡ects the choices of the underlying individual forecasters-whose new information is noisier individually than in aggregate-so that the consensus forecast overweights older information. Using a cross-country panel of growth forecasts and new methodological insights, this paper …nds that: consensus forecasts are ine¢ cient as predicted; this is not due to individual forecaster irrationality; forecasters appear unaware of this ine¢ ciency; and a simple adjustment reduces forecast errors by 5 percent. It also discusses the result's implications for users of forecaster surveys and for the literature on information aggregation more generally.
Introduction
Consensus forecasts-mean or median forecasts from a panel of individual forecasters-are ine¢ cient. This result is not new, but it appears not to be well known and its empirical relevance has yet to be tested. 1 This paper illustrates the empirical relevance of the phenomenon using the well-known and widely used forecaster survey dataset produced by Consensus Economics, and discusses some potential rami…cations, both for users of this kind of survey data and for information aggregation more generally.
To understand this paper's empirical strategy, one must …rst appreciate the intuition behind the theoretical result. Consider a simple stylized model of the forecasting environment, in which a group of agents form independent forecasts based on a private signal and a common prior. Each individual forecaster, if producing an honest minimum variance forecast, will derive their forecast using Bayesian updating, that is, from a weighted average of the prior and the forecaster's private signal, where the weights re ‡ect their relative variance. The consensus forecast will then weight the prior and the average private signal using the same relative weights (on average) as the private forecasters. But the mean private signal has a lower variance than each of the individual signals (this is the argument for employing the consensus forecast in the …rst place). In other words, the consensus forecast over weights the prior, and as a result is ine¢ cient. Notably, it is (negatively) correlated with its own forecast error. This result is a general one and does not rely on strategic forecasting behavior or heterogeneous signal precision.
One can test the empirical relevance of the result by analyzing the relationship between the forecast errors associated with the consensus forecast (the di¤erence between the consensus forecast and the actual realization) and the revisions to the consensus forecast (the di¤erence between the current consensus forecast and the previous one). In undertaking this test, this paper carefully outlines the assumed data structure and several important econometric factors that have hindered testing in this area. We build on insights in the existing literature on e¢ ciency/rationality testing using forecast data (Zarnowitz, 1985 ; Keane and Runkle, 1990 ; Batchelor and Dua, 1991; Davies and Lahiri, 1995; Bonham and Cohen, 2001 ) and provide some new insights. In particular, we show that the assumed forecast structure in Davies and Lahiri (1995) , while approximately correct for analyzing forecaster behavior in the context of repeated forecasts at di¤erent time horizons and multiple forecasters per horizon, is inconsistent with rational forecaster behavior in a fully speci…ed model of the information structure. In a fully speci…ed model, rational forecaster behavior creates additional econometric challenges, which this paper's empirical strategy addresses.
The results of this empirical exercise are unambiguous. There is very strong evidence that consensus forecasts are indeed ine¢ cient, and that this ine¢ ciency is quantitatively important, particularly at forecast horizons of around 12 months or less. These empirical results have a number of interesting implications. Consensus forecasts-the mean or median forecast from a panel of professional forecasters-are a widely used tool for researchers and policymakers. For instance, central banks frequently present consensus private sector forecasts alongside their own in-house forecasts as a means of increasing the credibility of their own forecasts and policymaking. 2 Consensus forecasts are also employed in the academic literature as proxies for expectations more broadly (e.g. Johnson, 2002) or as a benchmark against which to test individual public or private sector forecasters (Barakchian and Crowe, 2009; Romer and Romer, 2000) . However, this paper argues that more caution should be exercised when using consensus forecasts. In particular, the consensus forecast does not typically represent the best (most e¢ cient) estimate of the true state of the world, conditional on the aggregate information set. Its use as a benchmark may therefore ‡atter the performance of alternative forecasts. This paper also has implications for the debate over the e¢ cacy of releasing more transparent public information sparked in part by the contribution of Morris and Shin (2002) and, in the policy sphere, by moves toward greater transparency by central banks, notably in the context of in ‡ation targeting (IT) regimes. One can show that-even without Morris and Shin's "Beauty Contest"component to the forecasting process-more transparent public information can increase the forecast error for the consensus forecast, even as the forecast errors of individual forecasts are reduced. Moreover, the parameter restrictions (with respect to the relative noisiness of the public and private information) for this negative e¤ect on consensus forecast accuracy are considerably less restrictive than in the Morris and Shin case for individual forecasts. Whereas, in the Morris and Shin case, the condition for more accurate public information to reduce the accuracy of individual forecasts requires that the public signals are no less than one-eighth as accurate as the private signals, the negative e¤ect for consensus forecasts holds if the public signals are simply less accurate than the private. While the former condition is indeed unlikely, the latter seems plausible in some cases. More broadly, the lesson that better public information can lead to worse collective 2 Examples include the ECB's Survey of Professional Forecasters (http://www.ecb.int/stats/prices/indic/forecast/html/index.en.html); and the Survey of Professional Forecasters carried out by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (http://www.phil.frb.org/research-anddata/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/). The Bank of England also carries out a quarterly survey of external forecasters (see, for instance, the August 2009 In ‡ation Report, p.50).
judgments is, I believe, a general one with many applications: in the paper, I discuss an application to the U.S. …nancial crisis. This paper's results can also be related to other models of information aggregation and social learning. For instance, in Benabou's (2009) model of "groupthink"or collective delusion, agents'anticipatory feelings (deriving utility not just from the realization of an event but the anticipation of its realization) can generate individually-rational delusion that is collectively reinforcing, creating incentives for "groupthink"(collective blindness to reality). This paper demonstrates that a simple signal extraction model can generate a similar phenomenonthe collective judgment embodied in the consensus forecast puts too much emphasis on the group's shared prior over new information-without departing from standard speci…cations of utility. The model outlined here di¤ers from models of social learning that generate herd behavior (e.g. Banerjee, 1992) in that the ine¢ ciency of the consensus forecast does not stem from forecasts being made public sequentially, but from the communication of posterior beliefs rather than raw signals. Nevertheless, it shares the core feature of these models identi…ed by Benabou (2009) : "the key problem is a failure to aggregate private signals and its cure resides in more communication."A subtle insight from this model is that the form of communication is central to e¢ cient aggregation. Agents must be induced to communicate not their best guess, but rather their idiosyncratic information. Moreover, communication may not be su¢ cient: the empirical evidence suggests that agents fail to optimally use the aggregate information that does become available.
Finally, this paper's results point to an additional kind of aggregation problem-moving between microeconomic and macroeconomic models. For instance, it may be invalid to use macroeconomic or average data to derive insights into individual behavior: as demonstrated in this paper, the empirical …nding that consensus forecasts are ine¢ cient does not imply that individual forecasts are not rational. More signi…cantly, the results suggest that insights based on individual behavior do not necessarily carry over to a macroeconomic (multi-agent) environment. Even when agents' behavior imposes no externality, insights derived from individual rationality (e.g. that expectations are rational) may not hold in aggregate. The economy does not behave "as if"it were populated by a single rational representative agent. 3 Since asset prices also re ‡ect the aggregation of idiosyncratic private information, the results in this paper could also shed light on asset price phenomena (for instance, the success of momentum trading strategies detailed in Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993 , and Hong and Stein, 1999 , although a treatment of this subject is beyond the scope of the current paper. 4 3 The fact that this aggregation problem shows up with respect to expectations is particularly worrisome given the central role ascribed to rational expecations in most modern macroeconomic models. 4 Figlewski and Wachtel (1983) make a similar point: "the survey mean may not be a rational expectations Section 2 provides a formal discussion of the paper's key argument. It goes on to demonstrate that an e¢ cient forecast can be recovered by reducing the overweighting on the prior using a linear combination of the consensus forecast and the prior. The size of the required adjustment is increasing in the relative variance of the individual forecasters'idiosyncratic private information. 5 This section also illustrates how the paper's predictions can be formulated as empirical hypotheses in the context of the data, and discusses some important econometric concerns that additionally dictate the empirical strategy. Section 3 illustrates the argument using a large dataset of individual monthly forecasts of annual economic growth for a cross-section of countries between 1989 and 2008. It describes the data, then presents evidence of the existence and size of the ine¢ ciency associated with employing consensus forecasts for di¤erent countries and time horizons. There is strong evidence of ine¢ ciency for consensus forecasts, much less so for individual forecasts, as predicted by the model. 6 The results are robust to employing a median rather than a mean forecast as the measure of the consensus forecast, and to using real time (early) GDP estimates rather than revised data to measure the actual GDP out-turn. Using the adjustment method outlined above and employing the most recent previous consensus forecast as a proxy for the prior, one can obtain adjusted forecasts with mean squared errors on average more than 5 percent lower than the raw consensus forecasts, for forecasting horizons of a year or less, even out of sample. This e¤ect may appear small; however, the reduction in forecast errors associated with the adjustment is typically greater than the reduction associated with using the next month's consensus forecasts (i.e., with one month's additional data available to forecasters). Moreover, since consensus forecasts are generally thought to be at, or near, the frontier in terms of forecast accuracy (see, e.g., Ang et al., 2007 , for an application to in ‡a-tion forecasts), the fact that a simple adjustment technique can reduce forecast errors at all is signi…cant. However, there is no evidence that forecasters make the necessary adjustment to the previous month's consensus forecast in updating their prior. Section 4 provides a fuller discussion of how our model relates to some of the existing literature discussed above. Section 5 then concludes with a discussion of implications for forecast even when all of the individual forecasts are rational. One can apply the same reasoning to any market aggregation of individual expectations. This suggests that market information e¢ ciency may not be easily achieved at all when individuals have incomplete information." 5 This section replicates the key results in Kim, Lim and Shaw (2001) for the case with a continuum rather than a …nite number of individual forecasters. 6 The di¤erence in performance between consensus and individual forecast rationality tests has been noted before. For instance, Batchelor and Dua (1991) argue that "rationality tests on the consensus forecasts provide a poor guide to the extent of rationality among individual forecasters". Similarly, Harvey et al. (2001) note the strong autocorrelation of revisions to consensus forecasts, which, they argue, imply that "the consensus forecasts cannot be optimal. However, this phenomenon was far less apparent when the records of particular individual forecasters were examined." optimal forecasting methods and the use of consensus forecasts by central banks and other institutions.
Model and Empirical Strategy

Basic Model and Results
The following model captures the basic features of this discussion. A variable y is distributed iid with mean and variance 2 :
A continuum of agents i 2 [0; 1] each receives a private signal of y, given by x i :
where u is an aggregate error, iid mean-zero with variance Agents form forecasts following the usual Bayesian updating:
where F i minimizes the root mean squared forecast error and is therefore given by:
The consensus forecast is ine¢ cient, even as individual forecasts are all e¢ cient.
Proof. The individual forecasts are uncorrelated with their forecast errors:
De…ne the consensus forecast as the mean forecast:
Then the consensus forecast is correlated with its forecast errors:
This result applies equally to the median if " i is symmetric (or, more generally, if its median is zero), and generalizes to the case with heterogeneous 2 " or a …nite number of agents (Kim, Lim and Shaw, 2001 present a proof for the latter case). The easiest way to understand this result is to compare the individually-rational relative weight F on the individual signal (y + u + " i ) with the collectively optimal weight F that would arise from minimizing the root mean squared forecast error associated with the aggregate signal (y + u):
Because the aggregate signal has a lower variance than the individual signals, it should receive a higher weight. Then the optimal forecast f is uncorrelated with its forecast errors:
If the prior and the variances of the various shocks are known, then once the consensus forecast is observed the optimal forecast can be derived as a linear combination of the consensus forecast and the prior:
Assumed Information Structure of Data
To test the main proposition of the paper, one must …rst modify the model to match the information structure of the data. The key di¤erence between the simple model outlined in the previous section and the forecasting environment of the data is that repeated forecasts are made for each forecast period. Hence, for each forecast at horizon h 2 f1; 2; :::; 23g for country c and period , the public information re ‡ected in the prior ch will include previously published consensus forecasts. 7 The assumed information structure is similar to that in Davies and Lahiri (1995) . The key di¤erence is that this paper derives forecasters'optimal forecasts based wholly on the underlying information structure, whereas Davies and Lahiri have an explicit information structure for common shocks but assume idiosyncratic forecasting errors rather than deriving forecast dispersal based on idiosyncratic signals. In fact, one can show that the forecast structure assumed by Davies and Lahiri is inconsistent with optimal forecasts. Once one derives dispersed signals endogenously, then optimal forecasting behavior with respect to the common shocks changes, and this then has implications for the behavior of consensus forecasts. With respect to more cosmetic changes, this paper ignores forecaster-speci…c bias (since this paper is not concerned with testing for bias) and also allows for a …nal shock to the variable outside the forecasting window (to capture forecast revisions).
The forecast target, output y c , is assumed to be a function of 25 iid monthly shocks, one per month during the two year maximum forecast horizon and a …nal shock after the forecast horizon is complete due to data revision. That is:
where h indexes the forecast horizon (the horizon 0 shock is due to data revision, and H = 24 since the maximum forecasting horizon is two years). At the start of each month, agents i observe two signals of y c . The …rst is a common prior h , based on the shocks observed through the previous month:
Agents also receive an idiosyncratic, mean-zero signal of the current month's shock, which provides a second signal of y c :
7 Forecasts are available monthly, and are for annual data up to two years ahead. Hence, there are 24 forecasts for each country and time period, with a forecast horizon of between 1 and 24 months. The structure of the data is described in more detail in section 3.1. 8 Note that the previous month is indexed by its forecast horizon h + 1 (the forecast horizon falls over time).
With this information structure, agents'optimal forecast of y c is given by:
with consensus forecasts denoted:
Here, the key characteristic of consensus forecasts-underreaction to aggregate new informationis clearly observable. By contrast, the optimal forecast based on the aggregate signal fully absorbs the new shock h :
Empirical Methodology
This subsection outlines the empirical methodology for testing for consensus forecast ine¢ ciency, within the context of the assumed information structure. The Appendix has a parallel discussion with respect to testing for individual forecast rationality, where similar issues arise. The …rst step is to de…ne the consensus forecasts e¢ ciency test, which is based on a regression of forecast errors on the di¤erence between the forecast and the prior. Under the hypothesis that consensus forecasts under-react to new information, the estimated slope coe¢ cient will be negative. Next, I outline some challenges that arise in implementing this test in practice. The …rst is arriving at a suitable empirical proxy for the prior (which is unobserved by the researcher). I outline two cases, a 'naive priors'case in which forecasters are assumed to use the previous consensus forecast, and a 'rational priors'case in which forecasters use the actual prior h as in the model. Testing for forecast e¢ ciency is simpler in the former case than in the latter, as under rational priors all past updates to forecasts, not only the most recent update, 9 Davies and Lahiri (1995) implicitly set F = 1 (that is, forecasters fully absorb the common shock on average) but forecasts are also dispersed around the mean. This is inconsistent with optimal forecasting behavior: the common shock h will only be fully absorbed if it is observed without any noise, otherwise it is optimal to place some weight on the prior ( h = 0). If forecasters have access to a signal without noise, then they will ignore any noisy signal and the noise term " i h should therefore not enter into their forecast. The forecast structure that Davies and Lahiri propose is consistent only with a measurement error explanation for forecast dispersal: i.e., all forecasters have the same forecast and di¤erences simply re ‡ect errors in reporting forecasts to the survey. This seems implausible. Note that optimal forecasts have properties that di¤er from the assumed forecast structure in Davies and Lahiri. In particular, they have a richer autocorrelation structure: the common component follows an MA(1) process rather than being white noise. This poses additional econometric challenges for rationality tests, beyond those identi…ed by Davies and Lahiri. must be included in the regression. One can demonstrate that falsely rejecting the rational case in favor of the naive case leads one to under-estimate the slope coe¢ cient in absolute terms, so that in this case a signi…cant negative coe¢ cient can still be treated as evidence for ine¢ ciency. The naive priors case is therefore treated as the baseline for the empirical analysis. This decision is supported by the empirical analysis, which …nds little evidence for the rational priors case.
The unique panel structure of forecast data pose additional econometric challenges, which are also addressed here. Finally, this section outlines a measure of the ine¢ ciency embedded in consensus forecasts.
In the context of the information structure outlined above, the assertion in (7) that consensus forecasts are ine¢ cient still holds:
To test this hypotheses in a regression setting, note that:
where
h is orthogonal to f ch ch (and indeed to anything known through horizon h).
As discussed above, one can make two alternative assumptions about the prior ch that is adopted in each forecasting period. The …rst assumption is that forecasters know the true prior h , either because they perfectly observe the ‡ow of past shocks h+1 ; :::; H or because they adjust the previous month's consensus forecast to re ‡ect its underreaction to new information (this is the 'rational priors'case). The second assumption is that forecasters naively use the previous consensus forecast ( ch = f c(h+1) ), perhaps due to bounded rationality (the 'naive priors'case).
Assuming that forecasters know the true prior, then substituting observables for ch yields:
That is, forecast errors should be a function of all past forecast updates f ch ; :::; f c(H 1) . With naive priors, forecast errors are a function only of the most recent forecast update:
If the rational case is falsely rejected, assuming the naive case will introduce some bias if forecasters actually use the true prior, since f c(h+1) is correlated with the error term:
However, the direction of bias is towards zero, while the bias is likely to be small as long as the ine¢ ciency associated with the consensus forecasts is relatively small (F close to 1).
The following regressions are therefore run to assess consensus forecast e¢ ciency. The most general speci…cation includes all lagged forecast updates:
The naive priors case corresponds to the special case:
while the rational priors case implies a distinctive pattern of alternating signs predicted for the B jh coe¢ cients:
While the …rst inequality is implied by the model with both rational and naive priors, the subsequent inequalities are necessary under the rational priors case. Hence, evidence against signi…cant coe¢ cients on lagged forecast updates and this pattern of alternating signs would lead one to reject the hypothesis that priors are rational, in favor of the naive case.
Under both rational and naive priors, the error terms e cht have a complex structure over forecast horizons h and adjacent forecast periods . Because e cht = P h 1 j=0 j includes only subsequent shocks that are orthogonal to information through horizon h, the errors are contemporaneously uncorrelated with the regressors. However, neither (25) nor the restricted version (26) can be estimated over a sample that pools across forecast horizons, since e cht includes subsequent shocks that are correlated with the regressors when subsequent forecasts are included (the Appendix provides a further discussion of this issue, which is common to consensus and individual forecasts).
Parameter estimates from separate regressions (per h) should yield consistent estimates. However, to improve the e¢ ciency of our baseline estimates I adopt the following iterative procedure. Assuming that the naive priors case is the appropriate one, I estimate (26) for h = 1. In this case,
One can then subtract the estimated residuals b e c1 from the left hand side of (26) estimated for h = 2:
where e c2 = 1 :
The residuals b e c2 can then be used as a proxy for 2 in equation (26) estimated for h = 3:
where e c3 = 2 ;
and so on. 12 Since the iterated use of residuals could generate more noise, results from this procedure are presented alongside results from simple regressions of (26).
Finally, an estimate of the e¢ cient forecast f ch can be obtained by transforming the consensus forecast using the estimated regression coe¢ cient from (26):
To provide a metric for the e¢ ciency gain that can be obtained via this transformation, I compare the root mean square error (RMSE) of the raw forecasts f ch with the RMSE of the adjusted forecasts:
This measure can be compared across forecast horizons and countries to ascertain in which environments the adjustment is most useful for improving forecasting e¢ ciency.
growth over the current and next calendar year: the forecast horizon (dated to the end of the forecast year) therefore varies from 1 to 24 months. Consensus forecasts are obtained by taking a simple arithmetic average across all forecasters for the forecast year ( ), time horizon (h) and country (c) in question (as a robustness check, we also undertake analysis using the median). The consensus dataset is therefore a three-dimensional panel covering up to 38 countries, 20 years and 24 forecast horizons. Forecast errors are calculated with respect to annual GDP growth in the calendar year in question, y c taken from the IMF's World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. The baseline results ignore questions of data revision by using …nal data. 15 
E¢ ciency Tests
This subsection presents the results of the e¢ ciency tests outlined in section 2.3. First, it presents simple correlation coe¢ cients for forecast errors and forecast updates, at the level of the individual forecaster and consensus forecasts, to provide some initial evidence of the aggregation problem. Further evidence on individual forecaster rationality is presented in the Appendix. Second, it estimates equation (25), including the full set of lagged forecast updates as in the rational priors case, to more thoroughly assess evidence of the aggregation problem. These results suggest that the rational priors case can be rejected in favor of the simpler naive priors case, and the remainder of the results assume this latter case is the relevant one. The baseline results under naive priors are then presented, both with and without the adjustment to the dependent variable using residuals from regressions for subsequent forecast horizons outlined in section 2.3.
To provide some initial evidence concerning our main argument, and ignoring for the time being the econometric issues discussed in section 2.3 and the Appendix, Table 1 presents simple bivariate correlations between the most recent period's forecast updates and forecast errors, for the full sample as well as for di¤erent forecast horizons. The …rst column provides correlation coe¢ cients for the individual forecasts, while the second provides coe¢ cients for the consensus forecasts.
[ Table 1 about here] There is evidence for some positive correlation for the individual forecasters, which would suggest over weighting of new information. However, this appears due to the positive bias created by pooling across forecasters with common forecast targets noted by Zarnowitz (1985) and others. The appendix outlines a method for assessing rationality among individual forecasters that is not subject to this bias, which …nds some very limited evidence of under weighting of new information. However, results for consensus forecasts are very di¤erent. Here, there is strong evidence for negative correlation, particularly at forecast horizons of under 13 months. Estimated negative correlation coe¢ cients are as high as 40 percent in absolute value. Table 2 presents a summary of results from estimating regression equations including the full set of lagged forecast updates, as in (25). This table presents the weighted mean beta coe¢ cient from the set of relevant per-forecast horizon regressions (weighted by the inverse of the variance of the coe¢ cient estimates). 16 Signi…cance levels are based on a z-test using the standard error of the weighted mean. The last two columns give the proportion of relevant per-forecast horizon regressions in which the beta coe¢ cient is found to be signi…cant at the 1 percent level and to have a positive and negative sign, respectively. The predicted sign under the rational priors case is highlighted in bold.
[ Table 2 about here] Looking at the mean beta coe¢ cient estimates, only two additional lagged forecast updates (in addition to the most recent update) are statistically signi…cant, and of these one has the "wrong" sign. A similar pattern emerges from the raw per-forecast horizon results. Hence, the evidence is not supportive of the rational priors case. In terms of forecaster behavior, this result suggests that forecasters do not adjust the previous month's consensus forecast in updating their forecasts, but rather use it naively. In fact, the signi…cant negative average coe¢ cient on the …rst lagged update (as opposed to the positive coe¢ cient predicted under rational priors) suggests that even the raw consensus forecast is not fully absorbed 16 The number of regressions from which the underlying beta coe¢ cients are drawn varies across updates at di¤erent lags. E.g., the update at lag 1 is included in all 23 underlying regressions, while the update at lag 23 is included only in the regression at h = 1. Note that these results exclude observations for countries and years with bimonthly forecasts, since this speci…cation requires the full set of 23 forecast horizons.
into the prior in the …rst month. Given the evidence against rational priors, the remainder of the results therefore focus on the simpler naive priors case, and include only the most recent forecast update. Tables 3 and 4 presents the key results. They show regression results for univariate speci…cations with the consensus forecast errors as the dependent variable and the most recent update to the consensus forecast as the independent variable for each of the 23 forecast horizons, based on the methodology outlined in Section 2.3. Table 3 presents results for simple regressions with the "raw" forecast error as the dependent variable, while Table 4 presents results in which the forecast error is adjusted using residuals from prior forecast periods. 17 [ Tables 3 and 4 about here] There is very signi…cant evidence of underweighting of new information in the consensus forecasts, as predicted. The results are strongest at shorter forecast horizons: the largest beta coe¢ cient estimate in absolute terms is for the 8-month horizon, using both the raw and adjusted forecast errors. Coe¢ cient estimates are somewhat larger using the raw errors as the dependent variable as in Table 3 , but the resulting adjustment accounts for a much larger share of the overall forecast error, re ‡ected in signi…cantly higher R 2 s, for the adjusted forecast error speci…cations in Table 4 . 18 Coe¢ cient estimates are also more uniform and signi…cant over a larger range of forecast horizons in this latter case. These results shed some light on the relative variance of idiosyncratic and shared information available to forecasters at di¤erent forecasting horizons. Using the results from Table  4 as representing the best estimates, the estimated coe¢ cient on the consensus forecast update is generally in the range of 0:5 to 1:5, suggesting that the variance of forecasters' idiosyncratic signals 2 " , at the shorter forecast horizons where the e¤ect is signi…cant, is of a similar magnitude to the variance of the common signals,
2 . This implies a value of F or around 0.5: the consensus forecast typically absorbs only half of the aggregate new information available each period.
E¢ ciency Gains from adjusted Consensus Forecasts
The next step is to calculate the e¢ ciency gain associated with an appropriate adjustment of the consensus forecasts, as in (32). In all cases, the naive priors case is assumed to be the relevant one. A complicating factor is that the relative variance of private and public signals is likely to di¤er systematically across countries as well as across time periods, and a good correction technique should allow for this. Allowing b j to di¤er across each country and time horizon would risk over-parameterizing the model, reducing the precision of parameter estimates and undermining the legitimacy of the resulting adjusted forecasts (particularly out of sample). However, analysis of the b h coe¢ cients in Table 3 suggests a systematic pattern across three broad time horizons, which points to a relatively parsimonious parameterization, in which the slope coe¢ cient b j is assumed to di¤er across each country c and within the three broad time horizons H = f1 7; 8 14; 15 23g. The following speci…cation is therefore run:
and corrected forecasts are derived using (31).
19 Tables 5 and 6 report the resulting (in-sample) e¢ ciency gains by country and by forecast horizon, respectively. To aid interpretation, these tables also present the e¢ ciency gains (reduction in RMSE) associated with using the next month's consensus forecast rather than the current month's (the e¢ ciency gain in this case is calculated as in (32), but with f c(h+1) substituted for b f ch ). Comparing the two sets of estimated e¢ ciency gains indicates whether adjusting this month's consensus leads to a similar reduction in forecast errors to having an additional month's information.
[ Tables 5 and 6 about here] The most signi…cant e¢ ciency gains are felt at a relatively short horizon, between 4 and 14 months. The maximum gain, at 13 months, is 9.9 percent. Overall, e¢ ciency gains average 3.7 percent, or 6.3 percent for horizons of 12 months or less. These e¢ ciency gains are marginally higher than the gains associated with replacing this month's consensus forecast with the next month's: in other words, adjusting this month's consensus forecast is more valuable than having an additional month of leading and coincident indicators to inform the individual forecasts. Among countries, e¢ ciency gains are generally largest for emerging markets and smallest for industrial countries. E¢ ciency gains may be largest for emerging market economies due to the relatively smaller time-series available for these countries, resulting in some over-…tting of the model in sample, as well as the greater growth volatility typically experienced.
Out of sample e¢ ciency gains are somewhat lower overall, but not markedly so (Tables 7  and 8) . 20 Again, out of sample e¢ ciency gains are somewhat better than the gains associated with having an additional month's worth of data to inform the individual forecasts. Some countries with very good in-sample performance (e.g. Indonesia), register a very poor out of sample performance, suggesting that some caution should be exercised in extrapolating in-sample patterns based on extreme events (such as the Asian crisis). Overall, however, one could have improved near-term forecast accuracy for forecasts made in 2007 and 2008 by more than 5 percent, with respect to the raw consensus forecast, based on the adjustment technique outlined here and data available through end-2006.
[ Tables 7 and 8 about here]
Robustness Checks
This subsection brie ‡y outlines the results of two robustness checks. The …rst simply replicates the results in Table 3 using the median forecast (rather than the mean) as the appropriate de…nition of the consensus forecast (Table 9) . Results are almost identical to the baseline.
[ Table 9 about here] The second robustness exercise deals with the issue of data revisions. A number of authors have suggested that forecasters aim to predict early releases of the data rather than subsequent revised estimates: this issue is of particular relevance to forecasts of GDP growth, where the data go through several rounds of (often substantial) data revisions up to a year after the end of the period in question (Keane and Runke, 1990; Loungani, 2001 ). Following Loungani (2001) , one can obtain preliminary or 'real time'estimates of GDP growth using GDP estimates taken from the relevant version of the IMF's WEO data archive. Speci…cally, the data presented in the April version of the dataset typically represents a …rst estimate of GDP growth during the previous year. Table 10 replicates the results in Table 3 using these 'real time'measures of actual GDP growth, which are available for 2002-08. Results are again almost identical to the baseline: in fact, the coe¢ cient on the forecast update is now negative and signi…cant across a wider set of individual forecast horizons, despite the reduction in sample size.
[ Table 10 about here] 20 In fact, gains are signi…cantly higher for some countries and time periods.
Discussion
Morris and Shin (2002): A Reassessment
Morris and Shin (2002) use a global games framework to model Keynes's (1936) "beauty contest." Keynes argues that agents' attempts to second guess the consensus forecast can damage the information-revelation role of market prices. Morris and Shin extend this logic to show that more transparent (lower variance) public signals could lead to higher forecast errors on the part of market participants. In their model, public information is over-weighted relative to agents'private signals because it is more helpful for second-guessing other agents and hence for aligning an agent's own forecast more closely with the consensus. More accurate public signals can exacerbate this over weighting problem, potentially increasing the volatility of agents'individual forecasts. Morris and Shin's arguments have been criticized, notably for the ad-hoc nature of the beauty contest element and because the parameter values necessary for their argument on the negative e¤ect of public information provision to hold are unrealistic (Svensson, 2006) . In particular, the public information must be at least eight times noisier than the private information, which seems unlikely (in the context of making central bank economic forecasts public) in light of evidence on the apparent superiority of central bank forecasts over their private sector counterparts (Barakchian and Crowe, 2009; Romer and Romer, 2000) .
This apparent superiority may be exaggerated by comparing central bank forecasts with ine¢ cient consensus forecasts rather than an e¢ cient aggregator of the private sector's information set. However, the logic of our model suggests that, even without the beauty contest element, the provision of more accurate public information could harm the accuracy of the consensus forecast, even if it has an unambiguously positive e¤ect on the accuracy of individual forecasts. Given the attention paid to the consensus forecast and its potential role for uninformed agents in the economy in forming their expectations, this could argue against greater transparency.
To formalize this argument, we …rst illustrate the e¤ect of changing the accuracy of public information in the context of our simple signal extraction model; we then analyze the e¤ect in Morris and Shin's model that includes the beauty contest element. In both cases we model more accurate public information as a reduction in the variance of the public prior, 2 .
In the context of our signal extraction model, the mean squared consensus forecast error is given by:
Di¤erentiating equation (34) with respect to 2 , assuming individually optimal weights F , yields:
which is positive if and only if:
Hence, more transparent public information can increase the forecast error for the consensus forecast if the public information is a relatively noisy signal and the common component of the private signal (u) is relatively unimportant compared to the idiosyncratic component ("). The intuition behind this result is relatively simple. Increasing the accuracy of the public signal (reducing 2 ) has a direct, positive, e¤ect on the accuracy of the consensus forecast, and a negative, indirect, e¤ect, that arises because forecasters over weight the public signal and the degree of over weighting increases when the public signal becomes more accurate (as 2 falls, the over weighting coe¢ cient
2 + 2 u increases). Hence, when 2 is high, the public signal receives a low weight so the direct e¤ect of reducing its variance is small. Similarly, when 2 " is high, the degree of over weighting is high and the indirect e¤ect of reducing the variance of the public signal is large.
In the special case where the private signals are purely idiosyncratic ( 2 u = 0), the condition (36) collapses to 2 < 2 " : this implies that greater transparency can increase the consensus forecast error if the public information is initially more noisy than agents' own signals. In this case, the direct e¤ect of having more accurate information is relatively small, because the public signal receives a relatively low weight, whereas the indirect e¤ect is large because the degree of over-weighting is signi…cant. This condition seems likely to hold in some situations. Moreover, the negative e¤ect on the accuracy of the consensus forecast does not require the "beauty contest"element, whereas greater transparency always improves the accuracy of individual forecasts without the beauty contest.
However, one can include the beauty contest element, as in Morris and Shin (2002) , so that forecasters now weight the public and private signals to minimize a loss function that is a weighted sum of the mean squared forecast error and the mean squared deviation of individual forecasts from the consensus. The weight on the beauty contest element is given by r:
As shown by Morris and Shin, agents now over weight the public signal:
and di¤erentiating (34) with respect to 2 yields:
(1 r)
For the special case considered by Morris and Shin ( 2 u = 0), this condition collapses to
. By contrast, the condition for more accurate public information making individual private forecasts more accurate is (2r 1) (1 r) 2 < 2 " . Comparing these two expressions yields a number of insights. First, while the condition for better public information to reduce the mean squared error of the individual forecasts always holds when the beauty contest is not present, it can fail to hold for consensus forecasts even without the beauty contest. This is because consensus forecasts over weight the public information even without the beauty contest element, so that the mechanism by which more public information can be harmful is also present without the beauty contest. In fact, while the beauty contest has to be relatively important (r > 0:5) for the harmful e¤ect of transparency to (potentially) be felt for the individual forecasts, the harmful e¤ect is most likely to hold for consensus forecasts when the beauty contest is relatively unimportant (r is low). The rationale for this is that the beauty contest is not the cause of the consensus forecast over weighting the prior: if one were to set 2 " to zero in (38) to eliminate the cause of overweighting the prior in the simple signal extraction model then the (1 r) terms drop out and one is left with the expression for the e¢ cient forecast weight F , regardless of the beauty contest. Hence, introducing the beauty contest reduces the impact of the mechanism by which the prior is overweighted, diluting the impact and making it less likely that an increase in transparency is harmful. Finally, since (2r 1) 1, the parameter space over which more accurate public information can be harmful is strictly larger for consensus forecasts than for individual forecasts.
"Groupthink", Bank Behavior and the Credit Crunch
The insights from this paper can also be related to recent work on "groupthink"or collective delusion by Benabou (2009). Benabou's model is based on a modi…cation to a standard utility function to incorporate anticipatory feelings (i.e. deriving utility from expected as well as actual consumption). With this modi…cation, Benabou is able to generate externalities from individual behavior that give rise to equilibria with self-ful…lling collective delusion. Agents rationally choose to ignore pertinent information, giving rise to collective judgments that di¤er systematically from reality.
The phenomenon of groupthink involves a number of features that distinguish it from the model in this paper, notably the introduction of anticipatory feelings that lead to rational self-denial (and ultimately mutually-reinforcing denial within groups) and the absence of a major role for idiosyncratic private information. Benabou's model is much richer than that of the current paper; nevertheless, there are some important complementarities between the two approaches. The collective failure to rationally process the available aggregate informationleading to the discarding of useful information-is the most obvious common feature to both models. Another commonality is the role of common group beliefs. In the "Groupthink" model agents choose to ignore information at odds with the group prior, leading to a less e¢ cient aggregation of private signals. In the simple signal extraction model in this paper the common prior is also over weighted collectively, although this behavior is individually rational. 21 Moreover, as discussed in relation to Morris and Shin's paper, a more accurate (lower variance) prior can lead to a less accurate collective forecast in our model. This result can provide insights into some of the groupthink phenomena discussed in Appendix A to Benabou's paper. An example of relevance to the recent U.S. …nancial crisis is that of groups of bank employees who appeared to systematically underestimate the risks associated with complex structured assets. For instance, increased use of sophisticated quantitative models for pricing assets may have genuinely provided a more accurate assessment of expected risks and returns that led to a lower-variance prior among managers and a (positive) direct e¤ect on the accuracy of their consensus forecast. However, this more accurate signal then caused the managers, receiving di¤use but ultimately correlated signals of potential downside risk (e.g. from their knowledge of the underlying assets'quality and experience of running traditional loan books), to rationally put greater weight on the group prior, collectively underweighting their noisy but (in aggregate) informative private signals, and therefore reducing consensus forecast accuracy. The condition for this underweighting e¤ect to dominate the direct e¤ect-that the group prior be no less noisy than the managers'own idiosyncratic signals-seems plausible, given that the models turned out to perform rather poorly out of sample. 22 In other words, the claims prior to the crisis that these new techniques were reducing risk, and the emerging consensus post-crisis that their use reduced the ability to foresee and forestall emerging risks, may both be accurate assessments. The …rst relates to the group prior; the second to the group posterior.
Conclusions
This paper has provided an empirical assessment and discussed the implications of a result …rst noted by Kim, Lim and Shaw (2001) , that consensus forecasts tend to over weight the prior at the expense of new information. Testing this result with respect to forecasts of economic growth taken from one of the most widely-used cross-country forecast datasets, one …nds robust evidence of this underreaction to new information. Moreover, this underreaction is clearly due to the forecast aggregation process, as individual forecasters appear to respond more or less appropriately to new information. Applying a suitable adjustment to the consensus forecasts using additional information contained in the change to the consensus forecast from the previous month's, one is able to obtain more accurate forecasts, particularly at horizons of a year or less (where the e¢ ciency gain is more than 5 percent on average, even out of sample). The gain in e¢ ciency is, on average, larger than that associated with having access to an additional month's data to inform the forecast. There is no evidence that forecasters make the necessary adjustment in practice, suggesting that this ine¢ ciency in the consensus forecast is not well understood even by the sophisticated market participants included in the survey. This paper has implications for consumers of consensus forecasts, including at central banks. Those using the forecasts need to be aware of the nature and source of their ine¢ ciency as aggregators of the information available to market participants. Forecast aggregation services (such as the one whose data are employed in this paper) may need to adjust their methodology to provide more e¢ cient consensus forecasts (although, for many countries, the e¢ ciency gain is likely to be relatively small). One method is to employ an ex post adjustment similar to the one used in this paper. An alternative method would be to attempt to elicit individual forecasts that place a higher weight on each forecaster's private signal compared to their best forecast. One means of achieving this in practice would be to provide incentives for strategic forecasting such that forecasters attempt to di¤erentiate their forecasts from those of others (Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2006) .
Although the paper's main insights relate to the aggregation of individual forecasts, the paper also has implications for those engaged in forecasting themselves. Forecasting technologies that decentralize information-gathering but centralize the production of a …nal forecast (as are typically employed in a central bank) may help to alleviate this problem of overweighting the prior. For instance, when combining insights from a number of quantitative forecasting models, it is better to apply judgment (i.e. shade towards the prior) only at the level of the aggregate forecast, rather than at the level of each individual model, particularly if in the latter case the weights placed on each model's 'raw'results relative to the prior are endogenously determined by their relative noisiness, either explicitly or implicitly.
Appendix: Testing for Individual Forecast Rationality
Within the context of this paper, which is concerned primarily with establishing whether consensus forecasts are ine¢ cient aggregators of individual information, individual forecast rationality is pertinent only to the extent that it sheds light on the performance of consensus forecasts. In particular, if one can establish that individual forecasts are approximately rational, then any ine¢ ciency identi…ed in consensus forecasts can be attributed to aggregation, and not to underlying forecaster behavior.
Individual forecasts are rational as long as the signals are weighted as in (16):
Taking this relationship to the data is hindered by the fact that we do not observe the prior ch . However, under the null of individual forecaster rationality the previous month's consensus forecast f c(h+1) can be used instead, since rationality implies a zero coe¢ cient in a regression of forecast errors f i ch substituting f c(h+1) for h ). The …rst case is intuitive, and follows from (41). In the second case:
One could therefore run the equation,
where rationality requires that = = 0. However, as noted by Zarnowitz (1985) , Davies and Lahiri (1995) and Bonham and Cohen (2001) , pooling individual forecasts that share common forecast targets y c will lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of . This is because, for a given realization of y c , forecast errors are positively correlated with forecasts, and so the estimated coe¢ cient b from a pooled regression of forecast errors on forecast updates will tend to be positive even when individual forecasts are rational and the true value is therefore zero. 23 The pooled forecasts do not inherit the characteristics of the individual forecasts for the same reason that the consensus forecasts do not, namely that the properties of rational forecasts hold conditional on the forecaster's information set, and a pooled sample includes forecasters whose information sets di¤er. The only exception is where all forecasters have the same information, in which case the forecasts for each forecast target will be the same (this corresponds to the case of 2 " = 0, which is also the only case in which the consensus forecast is e¢ cient, and indeed there is nothing to be gained from employing pooled individual as opposed to consensus forecasts in this instance).
In fact the same argument applies to pooling forecasts across time horizons, both for individual forecasts and for the consensus forecast. Again, the problem is that information sets di¤er across time horizons, so that rationality arguments can no longer be invoked to justify the assumption of orthogonality between forecasts and forecast errors. Hence, for a given realization of y c , forecast errors are once again positively correlated with forecasts when observations from di¤erent forecast horizons are pooled. To illustrate this, note that, assuming rationality, the residuals from (43) are given by:
where e Given these contraints, this paper follows Davies and Lahiri (2001) and exploits a further characteristic of rational individual forecasts-that forecast revisions are uncorrelated with information known at the time of the earlier forecast-to test for rationality. Speci…cally, I test for correlation between forecast revisions at adjacent forecast horizons, since the previous forecast revision is known at the time of the current revision and the two should therefore be uncorrelated. It turns out that this Martingale test of e¢ ciency is not subject to some of the empirical concerns raised with respect to more conventional tests based on forecast errors. It also allows us to ignore issues of data revision, as it does not make reference to because this covariance is the average of T covariances each of which is positive, needs to be quali…ed. In particular, the overall covariance depends not just on the average covariance (within each subsample) but on the covariance between sample means. For instance, if 2 " is small relative to 2 , then the covariance between sample means will dominate and the overall covariance will be close to zero. Bonham and Cohen (2001) raise additional concerns relating to microhomogeneity and stationarity, which the current paper does not address explicitly (although individual forecaster rationality is tested separately for each forecaster, therefore allowing for microheterogeneity). 24 Since the correlation enters via the common shock terms h rather than the idiosyncratic terms " the actual data y c .
In the context of the assumed information structure, the forecast revision at horizon h is given by:
Hence, current forecast revisions are uncorrelated with the most recent previous revision if forecasters are rational:
To test for forecaster rationality, one can therefore regress the current forecast revision on the previous revision:
Rationality requires that = = 0. In particular:
Note that the error terms e i cht now have a complex MA(1) structure across forecast horizons h, including separate MA(1) processes for " i cht and for ch . Because the former varies over both h and i, whereas the latter is common across i for a given h (and c; ), (46) no longer holds when observations are pooled across forecasters. Hence, even the Martingale e¢ ciency test needs to be run separately for each forecaster, although it can be pooled across forecast horizons h (as well as c; ).
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Running e¢ ciency tests by forecaster requires us to identify each forecaster. This is made more di¢ cult, in the context of the Consensus Economics dataset, by the fact that individual forecasters are identi…ed only by their (institutional) name rather than a numerical identi…er, and spelling/abbreviation changes make it hard to match forecasters consistently. This, 25 To see this, note that for any given (c; h; ), Cov f
0. The problem does not arise when forecasts are pooled across forecast horizons h for a given i because in this case both " i ch
and ch vary, so that the covariance is zero for optimal F . This issue does not arise in Davies and Lahiri (1995) because these authors assume that forecasters (on average) fully incorporate new information, so that the common component of the error term is iid rather than MA(1). However, as already discussed, this assumption is not consistent with rational forecaster behavior.
combined with a requirement that a relatively long time series (at least 40 observations) is available for each forecaster, reduces the sample size. The sample includes 125,545 observations over 1,342 individual forecasters. Table A1 summarizes the results. For both b and b , Table A1 presents the weighted mean (weighted by the inverse variance of the coe¢ cient estimate), the median, and the proportion of forecasters with statistically signi…cant negative and positive coe¢ cients (at the 1 percent level).
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[ Table A1 about here] These results suggest some modest under weighting of new information on the part of individual forecasters. The (weighted) mean estimated coe¢ cient is positive, as is the median, while 11 percent of individual coe¢ cients are positive and statistically signi…cant (while less than 2 percent are negative and signi…cant). A positive estimate of implies that
, so that the relative weight put on new information is below the optimal. However, this under weighting is limited compared to that identi…ed for the consensus forecast. It turns out that, although the Martingale e¢ ciency test undertaken for the individual forecasters is somewhat di¤erent to the simpler test undertaken for the consensus forecasts, the estimated and b coe¢ cients are directly comparable:
In fact, when there is no idiosyncratic uncertainty ( 2 " = 0) the two expressions coincide exactly. One can use these expressions and the estimated coe¢ cients to undertake back of the envelope calculations of the degree of under weighting of new information by both individual forecasters and the consensus. From Table 4 , the estimated value of b, at least for forecast horizons of a year or less, is around 1, implying that F = 0:5. Given the mean estimate of of around .04, this implies that the optimal individual weight F = The mean coefficient is weighted by the inverse of the variance. Significance Level denoted by *** (1 percent); ** (5 percent); * (10 percent); Based on a z-test of the null that the weighted mean is equal to zero. "Positive" and "Negative" give the proportion of individual coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and >0 and <0 respectively. Standard errors clustered by country. The predicted sign under rational priors is highlighted in bold.
weighted mean 
